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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
not be estopped from asserting the provision as a complete bar to plaintiff contractor's action.
The Statute of Limitations, however, does not apply when a shorter limitation is prescribed by the written contract of the parties,5 and while that shorter
limitation is still in effect. Thus in a similar situation, Soviero Bros. Contracting
Corp. v. City of New York, 6 the city successfully took advantage of a contract
provision limiting the time for bringing an action on the contract to one year.
This type of contract provision can operate to the advantage of either party
and, standing on no different ground than any other provision in the contract,
may be waived by the action of a party to the contract either expressly or impliedly. Moreover, an estoppel may arise against a municipality the same as
7
any other person.
The decision in the instant case, Planet Construction Corp. v. Board
of Education of The City of New York,8 represents a refusal by the Court of
Appeals to extend to privately and individually negotiated limitations the policy
considerations which prompted the Legislature to prohibit a municipal corporation from waiving or being estopped from asserting the general provisions of the
Statute of Limitations. In the present case the Statute will still limit the time
within which the plaintiff can commence an action. Thus the pocket book of a
municipality and ultimately its taxpayers is protected from the over-generosity
or incompetence of its officials to the extent that they may not deprive a
municipality of the benefit of the Statute of Limitations itself. However, in
placing a municipality on the same footing as anyone else in so far as contract
provisions for a shorter period of limitation are concerned, the municipality
and the taxpayer are to that extent deprived of some protection. This is not
necessarily a bad state of affairs, for, although the municipal officials are not
allowed to challenge or evade the wisdom of the Legislature in setting up the
extreme limit for bringing of an action, i.e., the Statute of Limitations, they
may, albeit sometimes inadvertantly, waive those private and individual -limitations set up by themselves and another party in the course of negotiating an
individual contract. -Since the source of the limitation is the will of the
contracting parties, and not that of the Legislature, as in the case of Statute of
Limitations, it seems far from inequitable that the parties to the contract
may by mutual agreement, waiver, or estoppel alter this type of contract
provision just as they might alter any other contract provision.
CoNTRIBUTIoN DEFIcrENciEs TO CITY PENSION FUND DUE TO EXTENSION OF

BENExrrs

Plaintiffs in Dunn v. City of New York 9 are members of the fire departS.
6.
7.
8.
9.

N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 10(1).
286 App. Div. 435, 142 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1st Dep't 1955).
Buffalo Library v. Wanamaker, 162 Misc. 26, 293 N.Y. Supp. 776 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
Supra note 1.
7 N.Y.2d 232, 196 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1959).
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ment of the City of New York. They are also members of the City Pension
Fund which is maintained by contributions from the City and individual members. The City pays fifty-five per cent of the amount necessary to insure a
member's retirement after twenty years service and the individual pays fortyfive per cent of that amount.
Plaintiff, Dunn, became eligible for appointment to the fire department
in September of 1942, but at that time he was in military service, so his name
was placed on a special eligibles list in accordance with Section 243 (7) of the
New York Military Law.10 He was discharged in April of 1946 and appointed
to the fire department that July. He became a member of the pension fund in
January of 1947. The percentage of Dunn's salary necessary to make up his
contribution to the pension fund was 9.31%. This percentage was computed on
the assumption that Dunn would make contributions to the fund for twenty
years and that he would retire in 1966, as the fund is based on years of service
rather than a fixed retirement age.
In 1947, however, an amendment to the New York Military Law gave
those persons who were in military service when their time for appointment
came, credit for their military service." As a result of this credit plaintiff,
Dunn, was deemed to have joined the fire department and the pension fund
as of September 1942 and therefore would be eligible for retirement in 1962,
four years earlier than contemplated. This amendment granting the credit also
provided that the city should pay one hundred per cent of the contribution
to the pension fund for the time Dunn was in service.
The fact that Dunn would be retiring at an earlier date, 1962 instead of
1966, meant that his benefits would be greater. To keep the pension fund
actuarially sound a recomputation was made based on the assumption that
Dunn was appointed in 1942 and had received the salary increments so as to
bring him up to full salary as of 1946. Actually Dunn did not reach full salary
until 1950. Based on the above mentioned assumption it was determined that
Dunn would have to contribute 9.57% of his salary, part of which he never
actually received. Dunn has been paying the higher percentage on the full
10. Any person whose name is on any eligible list shall, while in military duty,
retain his rights and status on such list. If the name of any such person is reached
for certification during his military duty, it shall be placed on a special eligible list
in the order of his original standing, provided he makes request therefore following termination of his military duty and during the period of his eligibility on
such list . . . Such names shall remain on such special eligible list for a period
of two years after the termination 'of such military duty ...
11.

§ 243(20):

(E.) Upon the death or retirement of a New York City member, but not otherwise, the city of New York.. . shall pay into the appropriate fund of the system
in which such member held membership at the time of his death or retirement, the
amount of all contributions which such member would have been required to make
if, during the period of his military duty, he had been present and had continuously performed the duties of the position or positions with respect to which
his rights-and benefits during the corresponding period or portion thereof are
determined. . . . Each such member shall be credited with such contributions
paid in his behalf by such city ... for all pension or retirement purposes.
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salary from 1950 and since the city paid the whole one hundred percent from
1942 to 1946, the only years in dispute are from 1946 to 1950.
The computation using the higher percentage was completed in 1950, but
Dunn's individual deficiency, $373.32, was not computed until 1956. Dunn
here sues individually and on behalf of others similarly situated to have a
directive of the Fire Commissioner, calling for payment of the deficiency, declared null and void. Plaintiffs were successful in the Supreme Court,12 and
the Appellate Division,' 3 but the order was unanimously reversed by the Court
4
of Appeals.1
Plaintiffs claim that to pay the higher percentage based on the hypothetical
salary is an impairment of a pension contract in that an increase in contributions would reduce their benefits and thus be a direct violation of Article
five of the New York Constitution.' 5 Dunn also contests payments covering
his six month probationary period since he was not allowed to join the pension
fund until January of 1947.
The Court felt that the result in the instant case depended on the interpretation of Section 243 of the New York Military Law. Although the amendment provided for payment by the city for the war years, it did not provide for
the deficiency which arose in the post war years due to the recomputation.
It was pointed out by the Court that those who were actually members
of the pension fund before they went into military service had to make contributions equal to the amount they would contribute if they were not in the
military service, if they wished to remain in the fund. Those persons however
were entitled to be restored to their former position with salary increments
upon their discharge. Assuming it was the Legislative intent to maintain some
equality between this group and plaintiffs in the instant case, the Court limited
the benefit conferred on plaintiffs to the credit and contributions for the war
years only.
The Court rejected Dunn's claim that to pay the deficiency based on
the higher percentage would be an impairment of contract by answering that
the original contract was made without the knowledge of benefits subsequently
conferred by Section 243 of New York Military Law. What the Court
seems to be saying is that when one enters a contract for retirement he agrees
to pay, not a specific amount of dollars, but an-amount sufficient to insure
guaranteed payments if retirement is to happen at a fixed time, according to
actuarial tables as they exist when the contract is made. Looking at it from
that point of view, plaintiff, although paying a higher percentage of his salary,
12.

9 Misc. 2d 1054, 171 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Sup. Ct. 1958).

13. 7 A.D.2d 711, 181 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1st Dep't 1959).
14. Supra note 9.
15. Article 5, § 7:
After July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in any pension or retirement
system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractual relationship,
the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.
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will pay no more than the amount required to insure these fixed payments according to actuarial tables as they existed when the contract was entered into.
Plaintiff's other contention, that he should not have to pay for the probationary period, was rejected on the ground that in computing the deficiencies
some mathematical inconsistancies must occur, but since plaintiff was given
credit for that period when his appointment was back dated to September of
1942 he was not prejudiced.
The Court in the instant case reached a result which is not only logical
and reasonable, but undoubtedly conforms with the legislative intent. Dunn
was not forced to pay any more than he would have paid had he actually
became a fireman in September of 1942, and contributed for twenty years.
In fact, the city has paid ti contribution for the four years while he was in
service. Plaintiff received four years credit and was in no way prejudiced by
being required to make up the deficiency necessary to keep the pension fund
actuarially sound.
JUDGMENT OF JURY NOT TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR DETERMINATION OF CITY'S

BOARD OF SAFETY

In the consolidated cases, Weiss v. Fote and Alexander v. Fote,'8 actions
to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a collision between two
automobiles at an intersection, the plaintiff Weiss, a pedestrian, sued the drivers
of both cars, Alexander and Fote, and also the City of Buffalo. The driver,
Alexander, sued Fote and the City of Buffalo. Both the Supreme Court of
Erie County and the Appellate Division found for the plaintiffs, 17 but only
against the defendant City of Buffalo and not against the allegedly negligent
automobile operators.
The negligence liability of the defendant City was predicated on the
theory that at the intersection where the accident occurred, the traffic signal
designed by the Board of Safety of the City of Buffalo did not have a sufficient
"clearance interval." Allegedly the four second interval of time between
the end of the green signal for east-west traffic and the beginning of the green
signal for north-south traffic was too short to allow the intersection to be
safely cleared of cars from one direction before inviting cars to procede from
the other direction and hence the design or plan of the traffic light was a proximate cause of the accident.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments against the City of Buffalo
and dismissed the complaints,' 8 holding that in the absence of some indication
that due care was not exercised in the prepaiation of the design, or that no
reasonable official could have accepted it, a jury verdict as to the reasonableness
of the time interval involved may not be substituted for the previous determination of that question by the legally authorized Board of Safety.
16.
17.
18.

7 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S2d 409 (1960).
8 A.D.2d 692, 186 N.Y.S.2d 233 (4th Dep't 1959).
Supra note 16.

